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The UCC and ME in Process 
By Ingrid Michelsen Billinger 
Ingrid Hillinger is an Associate Professor of Law at Marshall-
Wythe where she teaches contracts and commercia/law. This article 
reflects her passion for the "Code." 
This past fall, I was invited to attend a three-day 
conference on the Uniform New Payments Code ("the 
NPC")1, sponsored by the American Law Institute, the 
American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Le-
gal Education and the Permanent Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Commercial Code. My reaction to the invitation 
was something akin to what I suppose would happen if 
Paul Newman asked me out for lunch. Only my love for 
family, Marshall-Wythe and country surpasses my love 
of and interest in the UCC and anything connected with 
it. Having devoted the better part (read that "waking 
moments") of an entire summer to a U CC problem which 
required extensive research into the UCC's tumultuous 
legislative history, the prospect of actually witnessing the 
UCC "in process" both excited and intrigued me. During 
the time that the UCC drafters debated and defended 
their Code (from about 1949 until 1962), doubting Tho-
mases repeatedly questioned the need for a single uni-
form code covering all facets of a commercial transac-
tion. Many took an "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" 
attitude. They argued that the existing law was certain 
and a massive overhaul would precipitate endless litiga-
tion. These individuals believed that ambiguities and 
trouble spots in the existing law could be and should be 
remedied by limited, focused changes. The law did not 
need and these critics did not welcome a uniform com-
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mercia! code with its difficult terminology,concepts, and 
rephrasing of every existing legal principle. As I plodded 
through the hundreds of pages of committee reports, law 
reviews and testimony of this period, I found myself 
invariably siding with the drafters. They were unques-
tionably the good guys, wearing the white hats and 
championing the cause of reason and commercial good 
sense. I reacted to the Code's critics with naked disbelief 
and scorn-after all, how could anyone in his right mind 
doubt the rationality of a uniform commercial code? 
History repeated itself at the NPC conference. Scores 
of people went to the floor microphone to question the 
need for a uniform payments code, arguing that needed 
changes and clarifications could be accomplished by 
amending the existing code rather than by creating a 
whole new code. Although history was repeating itself, I 
was troubled because I seemed to be on the wrong side. 
I, too, was wondering why we needed the NPC and 
whether my allegiance had switched to the dark side. Did 
my opposition stem from an illegimate source, viz., six 
long and hard years, devoted to figuring out Articles 3 
and 4? A commentator once noted that some of Article 
3's oddities2 stemmed from dutiful reverence of loyal 
sons to the N.l.L.3 It occurred to me that I might have 
.become a loyal daughter of Article 4. By the end of the 
conference, I was relieved to know that the NPC drafters 
had persuaded me of the need for major change. The 
conference taught me a valuable lesson. It is a whole lot 
easier to make judgments about history than to judge 
history in the making. 
Although this particular draft of the NPC will never see 
the light of day because the critical interest groups-
banks, consumers and academics-all had serious prob-
lems with it, something like it is definitely on the horizon. 
The following synopsis provides a glimpse of the new 
joys and challenges that lie in store for all of us. 
At the moment, thanks to financial and technological 
ingenuity, a variety of payment systems exist. Of course, 
there is the old and definitely unchic way of paying-
cash. Also, there are the tried and true methods of check 
and promissory note. In the past couple of decades, 
payment by 3 party charge cards, the "plastic money" of 
VISA, Master Card, etc., has become extremely popular. 
More recently, electronic transfers-wire transfers-are 
the vogue. In addition, there are other, less well known 
payment systems. The so-called "otT-line debit card" is 
conceptually identical to the check. The buyer gives the 
merchant his debit card, which the merchant then uses to 
prepare a slip. The buyer who signs the slip thereby 
directs his bank (the card issuer) to pay the merchant. 
The merchant forwards the slip through the bank collec-
tion process. When the slip arrives at the bank which 
issued the debit card, the bank pays the merchant in 
accordance with the buyer's instructions. This kind of 
payment is not accomplished by electronic means. An 
"on-line" debit card does effect payment by electronic 
transmission. It is referred to as a "point-of-sale" (POS) 
transaction. The merchant has a computer terminal in his 
store and uses the buyer's debit card to debit the buyer's 
bank account and credit the merchant's account before 
the buyer leaves the store with his merchandise. 
There is also the "ACH" method of payment (auto-
mated clearing house) whereby parties can prearrange 
automatic payment. An ACH credit is prearranged by the 
payor-e.g., an employer can pay his payroll by directing 
his bank to credit periodically his employees' accounts. 
An ACH debit is an automatic, prearranged debit by the 
payee. For instance, by prearrangment of the parties, a 
utility company, as payee, can initiate a debit against a 
customer's account on a periodic basis. In addition, 
payment can occur through an automated teller machine 
(ATM) which is a computerized banking terminal. In 
1982, ATMs handled more than 2 billion transactions and 
involved in excess of $240 billion dollars.4 The sheer 
volume of checks that must be processed today has 
produced another development, viz. check truncation. 
Rather than moving checks through the country, the first 
bank in the collection process retains all checks it re-
ceives. Thereafter the check collection process and pay-
ment are accomplished by electronic transmissions be-
tween all the banks. The number and kinds of payment 
systems are mind-boggling and no end is in sight. 
Presently, Article 3 governs promissory notes, Article 
4 governs checks, the federal Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act (EFTA) governs electronic transfers and the federal 
Truth-in Lending Act (TILA) addresses 3 party credit 
cards. No statutory law exists with respect to ACHs, 
ATMs or "on line" debit cards. No one is sure whether 
Article 4 governs "off-line" debit cards. Article 4 applies 
to "items," which§ 4-104(g) defines as "any instrument 
for the payment of money even though it is not negotia-
ble." Article 4's application to truncated checks is also 
problematic, where is me item? 
The different bodies of law governing the different 
payment systems not surprisingly provide different rules. 
Not only does this affect 4ser choice, it also creates an 
impossible situation if the payment system in question is 
an amalgam of two or more payment methods. One 
conference speaker said that he had recently received a 
package of checks called "Master check." The letter 
accompanying the checks described them as "companion 
check loans" to be treated like a cash advance-"no one 
will know you are using credit." He had a charge card but 
no checking account with the bank that had sent the 
checks. How would one characterize that situation to 
determine the applicable law? 
The proliferation of payment systems and discrete 
bodies of law or no law at all led the NPC drafters to 
conclude that a single unified law concerning payments 
should be implemented. A unitary approach would avoid 
the legal quagmires and inconsistent approaches which 
have resulted and will continue to occur under our 
present state of affairs. The drafters believed that the 
"new legal framework should not distort user choices 
among different systems. " 5 To this end, the drafters 
imposed the same legal consequences on all kinds of 
transactions wherever technology and the nature of the 
transaction permitted similar treatment. 6 The NPC pro-
poses to replace Article 4, the EFTA and TILA. It also 
seeks to establish statutory rules for all those payment 
systems for which no statutory Jaw presently exists and 
the common Jaw is characterized by confusion and incon-
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sistencies. At bottom. the drafters intended the NPC to 
do for disparate payment systems what Article 9 did for 
disparate security devices. 7 
A unitary approach to all payment systems required an 
approach which would. of necessity, cover both paper 
and non-paper based transactions. This. in turn. necessi-
tated a whole new terminology and the NPC creates it 
with a vengeance. much to the bewilderment and audible 
groans of the audience. (l re-experienced the despair I 
had felt as a student taking Commercial Law 1.) To begin 
with. we do not have "banks" under the NPC. we have 
"account institutions." We have "account institutions" 
rather than "banks," because the word "bank" does not 
encompass credit unions, mutual funds, savings and loan 
institutions, Mastercharge, ATMs. and other forms of life 
which are implicated in today's payment systems. Sec-
tion 53(1) of the NPC defines an "account institution" as 
"any person which in the ordinary course of its business 
maintains accounts for its customers ... That seems sim-
ple enough until you get to the definition of "account," 
which § 50( I) defines as "a liability in money" (that 
covers banks, credit unions, etc.), "credit extended" 
(that covers finance companies such as VISA or Master-
charge) or "interest in assets on which orders may be 
drawn or to which orders may be credited" (that covers 
mutual funds). 
Because the NPC only applies to "orders," its defini-
tion of "order" is critical. Section 10(1) defines "order" 
as "a complete and unconditional direction by a person 
to pay (a) a sum certain in money; (b) from an account 
which may be accessed to pay a person other than the 
drawer or the drawee; (c) to take place immediately or at 
a definite time; (d) to or for the benefit of a specific payee. 
which may be the drawer or bearer and (f) identifying the 
drawer and if it is a written draw order, signed by the 
drawer." Although the NPC's "order" bears some re-
semblance to Article 3 's definition of a negotiable instru-
ment, there are several differences. First of all, the NPC 
obviously does not require a writing. As a result, it only 
requires a signature if there is a writing. Secondly, under 
Article 3, "bearer" can never be a specific payee but 
under the NPC, "he" can. Thirdly, the NPC adds a new 
thought by requiring an account which can be accessed to 
pay someone other than the drawer or drawee. The 
drafters deliberately excluded two-party charge cards 
from NPC coverage. Finally and most significantly, the 
NPC eliminates those dear little "magic words" of nego-
tiability. What does that mean in terms of the fundamen-
tal concepts of negotiability, holder in due course rights 
and the ability to cut off claims and defenses? The NPC 
has a complicated answer to that. Claims and defenses 
are not cut off as against a consumer drawer or with 
respect to any order which states that it is not entitled to 
"due course" rights. 
While some of us just mourned the passing of a venera-
ble tradition, the banking spokesmen were furious. "Just 
exactly how did the drafters propose to distinguish a 
consumer order from a non-consumer order?" The bank-
ing interests viewed the situation as yet another instance 
of the law "dumping" on the banks. Professor Hal Scott, 
Chief Reporter for the NPC, responded that the banks 
obviously would have to figure out some way to identify 
consumer accounts and hence consumer orders, but in 
light of technology and banking ingenuity, he felt that 
surely the problem was not insurmountable. He sug-
gested a specially colored check or a special computer 
symbol. 
The consumer interests vehemently objected to the 
consumer/non-consumer order distinction on other 
grounds. Section 50(12) defines "consumer account" as 
an account "in the name of one or more individuals 
unless such individuals have represented in writing to the 
account institution that the account is not to be used 
primarily for personal, family or household purposes." 
Although § 800(4) imposes civil liability on an account 
institution which advises an individual to misrepresent 
his intentions with respect to the account's use, the 
consumer interests maintained that lower charges could 
persuade individuals to waive their consumer account 
protection. Rational consumers might opt for lower 
charges and presumably nonconsumer accounts would 
involve lower charges because banking risks were less. 
The debate was followed by a huge (and heated) dis-
cussion about the advisability of allowing non-consumer 
drawers to eliminate due course rights by stating so on 
their instruments. This attack clearly surprised and be-
mused the drafters. Somewhat incredulously, they re-
sponded that Article 3 presently permits that. For in-
stance, an individual can eliminate any possibility of a 
subsequent holder in due course by simply scratching out 
the words "to the order of' on his check. Even though 
the drafters were absolutely correct-they were not 
really changing anything at all-they failed to persuade 
the audience of that fact. The audience perceived this 
change as fundamentally threatening our orderly com-
mercial society. (I found this concern to be uncommonly 
silly. Who would take either a check with the words "to 
the order of' scratched out or a NPC order indicating 
that due course rights were not available?) 
The NPC distinguishes between "draw orders" and 
"pay orders." Adraw order is "an order initiated by the 
drawer and transmitted to the payee ... " A check, for 
instance, is an example of a draw order. A "pay order" is 
"an order initiated by the drawer to the drawee directing 
the drawee to pay ... the payee ... " The speaker on this 
topic said that a draw order pulls funds back from the 
payor account institution to the account institution of 
first deposit for the benefit of the depositor, while a pay 
order pushes funds from the payor account institution to 
the account institution holding the payee's account. This 
push/pull metaphor obviously enamoured all the drafters. 
My initial response was "huh?" If you read it twenty 
times, you realize that the difference between a draw 
order and a pay order is to whom you give the order: 
draw orders go first to the payee, pay orders go directly 
from the drawer to the drawee. 
Because the NPC applies to non-paper based payment 
systems, the term "holder" became useless-holder of 
what? Therefore, the NPC had to create a new person. 
He is the "funds claimant." Because you cannot indorse 
non-writings, indorsers and indorsees had to go too. The 
NPC substitutes in their stead "transferors" and "trans-
ferees." That seems manageable until you get to pay 
orders when you have "funds transferors" and "funds 
transferees." The "funds transferor" is the person di-
rected to pay. The "funds transferee" is the person who 
is to receive payment. Even that is tolerable. It is only 
when you realize that there can be "funds claimant 
transferors" and "funds claimant transferees" that one 
begins to despair. Bowing to technological advances, the 
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NPC's new cast of characters also includes a new villain, 
the "interloper." He is the fellow who intercepts an 
electronic transmission and changes either the amount of 
the order or to whom it is payable or both. (By the time 
he was introduced, we were all tired and I was punchy. 
"Home, home on the range where the deer and the 
interloper play" kept going through my mind.) 
All of this new terminology and pushing and pulling did 
not sit well with the audience. In addition to general 
confusion, noises began to be made that maybe elec-
tronic transfer payment methods were different from 
checks which were different from credit cards and the 
differences really justified different treatments. At about 
this time, it also came out that Article 3 would continue 
to govern promissory notes and Article 4 might have to 
remain to govern promissory notes collected through 
banking channels. The NPC then would not replace 
Articles 3 and 4. It would be in addition to Article 3 and 
4! (I must admit to a fleeting sense of pleasure that if the 
NPC were adopted, our Commercial Law I course would 
have to be 8 credit hours.) 
By the end of the three days, it was clear that no one 
much liked the NPC. Consumer interests believed that 
the NPC gave fewer rights to consumers, the banks 
believed that it gave too many rights to consumers. 
Everyone thought that the language and terms were 
unduly complicated. Finally, over and above everything 
else, actual adoption of the NPC seemed impossible. In 
light of the supremacy clause, states could not success-
fully enact the NPC because it overrides federal law, viz., 
TILA and EFTA. That left as the only alternative federal 
enactment. No one dared to entrust the NPC to Con-
gress. The overall consensus then, for one reason or 
another or several, was negative in the extreme. 
Although this draft of the NPC will surely not be 
approved, and perhaps the basic dream of a uniform 
payments code will never become a reality, certainly 
some of its suggested clarifications of existing law will be 
adopted. For those devotees of Articles 3 and 4, here is a 
quick run down of issues you considered in Commercial 
Law I. 
I. The NPC adopts the reasoning of the West Side case 
and eliminates completion of the process of posting 
as a benchmark for final payment. § 420. 
2. A cow no longer qualifies as a negotiable instru-
ment, nor do bricks, tissue paper or cocktail nap-
kins. According to comment I to § 101, a payor 
account institution is only required "to pay autho-
rized orders initiated by an access device provided 
to the drawer by the account institution." Banks 
customarily do not issue the above as means to 
draw on accounts. 
3. Much to the objection of those in attendance, the 
NPC sounds the death knell to Price v. Neal. The 
drafters justified overturning this ancient doctrine 
by noting that with check truncation, the payor 
account institution cannot verify the drawer's signa-
ture. Even with non-truncated checks, banks do not 
verify signatures because it is uneconomical to do 
so. Section 204(1) sacrifices the finality afforded by 
Price v. Neal in favor of imposing the loss on the 
party who dealt with the thief. 
4. The sum certain requirement is satisfied even if the 
order contains a variable interest rate, if that inter-
est rate is based on a widely and publicly quoted 
interest rate, such as the federal funds rate or prime 
rate of a particular account institution. 
5. The NPC gives the intended beneficiary of a check a 
direct cause of action in conversion against the 
depository account institution, thereby codifying 
the present, albeit tortured, judicial "interpreta-
tion" of§ 3-419(3) (§ 205(1).) 
6. Section 50(3) defines "good faith" as the "absence 
of bad faith. Bad faith is dishonesty in fact, malice 
in the conduct or transaction concerned, or willful 
or reckless disregard of known material facts." (The 
banking representatives really kicked and hollered 
about this change. We were treated to impassioned 
pleas to shield banks from courts who might con-
strue bank stupidity as bad faith. Banks maintained 
that the Code should protect their stupidity.) 
I want to end my observations as I began them,-on a 
personal note. Professor Scott, a short man with wiry 
hair, typically sat at the front table facing the audience. 
He smoked. By the third day, he had taken to twirling his 
hair and chain-smoking. The situation must have been 
discouraging. On the first day, the chairman of the con-
ference had said that, absent consensus from the assem-
bled group, the NPC would never get anywhere. By the 
end of the conference, everyone knew what that consen-
sus was and what it meant. As I watched the dream of a 
uniform payments code unravel and Professor Scott twirl 
his hair more and more rapidly, I felt very sorry for him 
and all the drafters who had worked for 6 years on the 
project. It was not until the last day, the last hour almost, 
that someone stood before the microphone and thanked 
the committee for their fine and hard work and noted that 
it had not gone unappreciated. At the time, I thought 
back to Karl Llewellyn and Grant Gilmore and wondered 
how they had managed to weather 20 years of hostile 
critics, powerful lobbying groups, sheer stupidity, infight-
ing and every other unpleasantry that must be endured to 
make a vision become a reality. Emerging from the 
conference, I thought about the many unsung heroes 
whose blood, sweat and tears had changed our law for 
the better and paid my respects. 
Post-Script: On February 20, 1984, the Daily Press car-
ried an AP story headlined "Laws lacking on electronic 
crime actions." The article discussed a Justice Depart-
ment report expressing great concern about the inade-
quacy of existing crimina/laws with respect to electronic 
fund transfer and computer crime. Although electronic 
crimes have the same consequences as traditional theft, 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The origins of the acronym ''NPC'' are almost as complicated as the 
NPC itself. The Uniform Probate Code got to "UPC" first. That 
scotched the name "Uniform Payments Code." The drafters added 
the word "new" to give the letter "N" which was not the letter "U" 
and therefore permitted an available three letter acronym. 
2. The Article 3 definition of "value" which differs from the Article I 
definition of "value" is a good example of such an oddity. 
3. "N.l.L." stands for Negotiable Instruments Law, the law which 
preceded Article 3 and which every state had enacted as of I924. 
4. The Daily Press, Monday, February 20, 1984. 
5. Memorandum to National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws from Hal S. Scott, Reporter to the 3-4-8 Commit-
tee, dated June 15, 1983, p. I. 
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the traditional requirements for theft may not be present. 
For one thing, an electronic command may not constitute 
a taking. For another, the contents of a computer mem-
ory bank may not be property. In addition, criminal fraud 
requires misrepresentation to a person and legally, a 
computer may not be a person. According to the report, 
the absence of law, in conjunction with the proliferation 
of electronic based systems and the concommittant op-
portunity for crime, has created a critical situation. The 
absence of civil law produces an equally critical situation 
as courts attempt to allocate loss between innocent vic-
tims of these crimes. The NPC provides a set of rules 
allocating risks and can guide courts and also inform the 
parties at risk so that they can take steps to protect 
against loss (for instance, insurance) or allocate the loss 
differently by contract. 
6. Under the present situation, parties have different rights depending 
upon the payment system used. For instance, if a consumer pays a 
merchant by check, the consumer has no recourse against his bank 
once final payment occurs. If a consumer pays by a bank charge 
card, § 170 of TILA gives him certain rights. 
7. In fact, on the last day of the conference. a young. bright and 
somewhat brash academic noted the similarities of purpose between 
the NPC and Article 9 and then criticized the N PC for tracking itself 
along the lines of Article 4 rather than Article 9. In his opinion, 
Article 4 was the Code's most poorly drafted article and therefore a 
terrible model. Fairfax Leary ("Fax"), one ofthe Article 4 drafters, 
a general Code gadfly and conference participant, sat close by. The 
audience's response of "oooh" suggested that it did not want Fax's 
name to be taken in vain. 
